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Book Review: Stumbling Over Truth: The Inside Story and the
‘Sexed Up’ Dossier, Hutton and the BBC
The 2004 Hutton Report ushered in an age of self-doubt and caution at the BBC. It was also
the end of the most extraordinary experiment in news management Britain has ever seen: the
decade of Alastair Campbell, the Blair courtier who delivered New Labour’s mission to ‘create
the truth’. In Stumbling Over Truth, Kevin Marsh tells of his growing disillusion with the
British media’s appetite for holding power to account. An important book for anyone who wants
to understand the toe-to-toe confrontations between Tony Blair ’s government and the BBC,
and the fight to keep BBC journalism independent in the face of unprecedented government
pressure. Reviewed by Patrick Weir.
Stumbling Over Truth: The Inside Story and the ‘Sexed Up’ Dossier,
Hutton and the BBC. Kevin Marsh. Biteback.
Find this book:  
Stumbling Over Truth is a micro- level account of  crisis management at the
highest editorial and management echelons of  the BBC. This crisis
ult imately f orced the resignation of  the Director General, seriously
weakened the corporation’s reputation and poisoned its relationship with
senior polit icians. This is not 2012 but 2003, and surrounds the
intelligence dossiers used to support the case f or war in Iraq, rather than
the alleged criminality in light entertainment circles.
The crisis centred on the relationship between the BBC and Alistair
Campbell and specif ically, the death of  the weapons expert Dr. David Kelly
af ter he was revealed as the source Andrew Gilligan’s inf amous “6:07
broadcast” on the Today program. It was in this broadcast that Gilligan
said that the government “probably knew” that the claim that Iraqi WMD
could be deployed “within 45 minutes”, was “wrong”. Kevin Marsh, editor
at Today during the crisis, has waited f or ten years to publish his side of  the story.
Emblematic perhaps of  the maxim – truer nowhere more than in public lif e – that revenge is
best served cold.
It ’s perhaps no surprise then, that Marsh’s prof essional contempt f or Alistair Campbell runs
through the heart of  the book no less than the “story” about Dr Kelly, Gilligan and the dossiers. Campbell
is, variously, “A bully” and in government “Given power no unelected, party polit ical appointee should
have”(p.52). He is no less crit ical of  New Labour’s media management project of  “truth creation”, and
scorns the view that the media should be steered towards reporting f acts in a certain, f avourable light –
and undermined or ridiculed if  they proved non-compliant.
Amongst the f orensic recollections, some of  which are too detailed to be convincing, of  precisely who-
said-what- to-whom-when, important points do emerge which add to the history of  the story. Firstly, in the
init ial chapters outlining the period immediately af ter Gilligan’s broadcast, both Marsh and his superiors
believed that the entire “story” about the “45 minute claim” would die down. It was seen as simply one more
unremarkable spat between the BBC and Campbell’s media management machine. Given this version of
events, Marsh’s claim that the “re-starting” and subsequent escalation of  the row weeks later was a
calculated polit ical decision by Campbell seems highly plausible.  More importantly though, Campbell’s ability
to f rame the issue as one of  the BBC questioning his integrity, rather than his role in the polit ical
representation of  uncorroborated intelligence as un-qualif ied f act seems to have caught Marsh and his
bosses by surprise. The subsequent escalation of  the row emerges, in his account, as one in which the
BBC was being called upon to def end and justif y accusations it had not and was not making.
Marsh clearly f eels let down by the BBC, which leads to the second and most mystif ying element of  the
entire af f air: why, as the program editor, was he not called to give evidence to the Hutton enquiry? Marsh
of f ers his own reasons in chapter 8: Lord Hutton’s terms of  ref erence were too narrow, and his
interpretation of  them during the inquiry even more so. That he was too close to the establishment, with no
interest in digging f or answers relating to the polit ical management of  the intelligence picture. Or, more
tellingly, that the BBC’s legal team at the enquiry took against him, concerned that his testimony and ref usal
to backtrack on the substance of  Gilligan’s claims could be “toxic” to their strategy: to “admit everything”
and not to engage in the vital questions of  nuanced editorial and journalistic language which caused the
row in the f irst place. Regardless of  these personal interpretations, it still seems astonishing that Lord
Hutton f elt no need to hear evidence f rom the editor of  the program under investigation, pref erring to call
his superiors, who only became directly involved after the re-starting of  the row.
Perhaps most curiously though, what emerges f rom this account of  is an interesting narrative on the
interpretation of  the term “single source”. A central plank of  Lord Hutton’s crit icism of  the BBC and Gilligan
was that to question the integrity of  anyone involved in the production and presentation of  the dossier
based on a meeting with a “single anonymous source” (Dr Kelly) was bad journalism. What made this even
worse was when it emerged that Gilligan’s recollection of  his conversation with Dr. Kelly may not have been
totally accurate, such were his poor organizational skills. However, parallel to this is the “45 minute” claim,
the claim which was the subject of  Gilligan’s report in the f irst place. This was regarded as “weak” by the
intelligence community precisely because it  was “single sourced”. This the claim later turned out to have
f rom a taxi driver who subsequently denied all knowledge. What this raises, and Marsh acknowledges, is the
comparison but also potential double standard between journalists and the intelligence services “Both of
whom turn to secret sources to acquire inf ormation against the wishes of  those who’d rather keep it
secret”(p.97)
Any culpability on the BBC’s part he lays squarely at Andrew Gilligan’s door. The extent of  his crit icism
though, seems to stop at poor preparation and presentation, rather than the more serious charges of  lack
of  integrity and misreporting of  conversations with Dr. Kelly, as Lord Hutton was later to impugn him
with. The irony of  this book appearing so long af ter the events but so soon af ter another institutional
debacle at the BBC in 2012 is plain to see. The glacial pace at which crisis and danger are perceived and
acted upon within the BBC’s management structure seems to be ever-present between the lines. This
incapacity of  corporate governance to design robust crisis management procedures, and to learn f rom
previous mistakes in order to deal with emergent contingencies is, then, perhaps the strongest crit icism
that can be levelled at the BBC currently. Stumbling over Truth, perhaps accidentally, adds f urther weight to
this argument.
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